A characterization of rational amalgamation operations. by Cutello, V. & Montero, Javier
A Characterization of 
Rational Amalgamation 
Operations 
Vincenzo Cutello 
Fuzzy Logic R & D Group 
CoRiMMe*, Research Center, 
Catania, Italy 
Javier Montero 
Faculty of Mathematics 
Complutense University 
Madrid, Spain 
ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with amalgamation of fuzzy opinions when a fixed number of 
individuals is faced with an unknown umber of alternatives. The aggregation rule is 
defined by means of intensity aggregation operations that verify certain ethical condi- 
tions, and assuming fuzzy rationality as defined in [1, 2]. A necessary and sufficient 
condition for non-irrationality is presented, along with comments on the importance of 
the number of alternatives. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Arrow's paradox ([3]) in group decision-making has been translated in 
the past into a fuzzy context and it has been shown that such a negative 
result can be avoided in several ways. 
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The original problem was formalized by Arrow in the following way: 
given two or more individuals and supposing that each individual 
defines a (crisp) complete linear order over a fixed set of alterna- 
tives, can we always define in an ethical way a social (crisp) 
complete linear order corresponding to the given profile of social 
opinions? 
Therefore, it was assumed that each individual was able to define in a 
consistent way which alternative was the best among any possible pair of 
alternatives, and so for the group itself. Two basic approaches can be 
found in fuzzy literature, depending on how intensities of preferences are 
introduced. In [4] for example, it is assumed that individuals and group 
opinions are given in terms of fuzzy sets of feasible alternatives, o that 
each individual i defines a degree /_Li(x) of feasibility for each alternative 
x. These feasibility values have to be aggregated into social degrees of 
feasibility /x(x). Moreover, the set of individuals is not a priori fixed and 
social values are obtained through a successive aggregation of individual 
opinions, in a one by one fashion. The main result in [4] shows that only a 
class of mixed rules were possible in that context (see example 4.2). As it 
was proven in [5], the reason for such a restrictive result is based on the 
fact that the model does not take into account he number of individuals 
supporting each alternative, which does not seem to be ethical. 
More coherently with Arrow's welfare approach is to assume fuzzy 
binary preference relations. In this case, individual degrees of preference 
I~i(x, y) of the alternative x over the alternative y are defined for each 
pair of alternatives. These preferences have then to be aggregated into 
social preferences /z(x, y). In [1, 2], it was pointed out that the ethical 
conditions were not the key point in Arrow's problem (i.e., inconsistency of
collections of reasonable thical conditions), as much as the underlying 
idea of rationality (only complete linear orders were assumed). Indeed, in 
[6] the key point allowing to obtain a positive result in the Arrowian 
framework is the weakness of transitivity of fuzzy binary relations. If we 
substitute weak-transitivity with max-min transitivity, then the impossibil- 
ity will appear. Obviously, some ethical conditions must also be assumed in 
the fuzzy context as well as some degree of rationality for the preference 
relations. 
In this paper we will assume non-inconsistent (i.e., non-absolutely irra- 
tional in the sense of [1, 2]) complete fuzzy preference relations. The 
hypothesis of completeness has traditionally been assumed to formalize 
comparability between pairs of alternatives. More recently in [7], complete- 
ness has been proposed as a measure of support of the set of alternatives. 
Here, we will follow this second idea and we will assume completeness 
with the intended meaning that all individuals consider the set of alterna- 
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tives, on which they are expressing their opinion, feasible and comprehen- 
sive. In this paper, the amalgamation of preferences will not be obtained 
according to Arrow's model (rules for a fixed set of alternatives) but 
through intensity aggregation rules that will allow the successive aggrega- 
tion of alternatives. This approach seems to be in principle more realistic, 
because for instance most committees begin to analyze a problem without 
an a priori fixed number of final alternatives to be voted upon. 
To clarify the above comment consider a faculty search committee. First, 
apart from the number of applications, they set some rules that will guide 
the decision process. Then, once the deadline for the applications expires, 
they start reviewing the candidates whose CV's have already arrived. Some 
candidates are discarded and some remain and will be compared to new 
ones, whose CV's will be received later on. Starting the faculty search as 
early as possible speeds up the decision process, therefore aggregation 
rules that are independent from the number of alternatives are clearly 
needed. 
2. RATIONALITY AS A FUZZY PROPERTY 
Let #: X × X ~ [0, 1] be a fuzzy preference relation over an arbitrary 
finite set of alternatives X. /z(x,y) represents the degree to which the 
relation x not worse than y holds. Let us assume that g is complete in the 
sense that 
Then, the values 
I~(x,y)  + l~(y ,x )  >_ 1 Vx, y~X (2.1) 
/.z,(x, y) = p,(x, y) + /.L(y, x) - 1 
uB(x ,y )  = u(x ,y )  - m(x ,y )  
Uw(X,y) = u(y ,x )  - m(x ,y )  (2.2) 
can be understood, respectively, as the degree to which the two alterna- 
tives are indifferent (xly), the degree of strict preference of x over y, (xBy, 
x is better than y) and the degree of strict preference of y over x (xWy, x is 
worse than y). Hence, fuzzy preferences are modeled according to a fuzzy 
partition with three classes, in such a way that 
1~8(x,y) + /Zl(x,y ) + I~w(X,y ) = 1 Vx, y (2.3) 
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A cycle of preferences will be defined over chains G = (x I - x 2 . . . . .  x k 
-x  1) of k distinct alternatives as 
XlPlx2P 2 ... x~Pkx 1
where Ph ~ {W,I,B} for all h = 1,2 . . . .  ,k. A cycle xlPlx2P 2 ... x~Pkx 1
is irrational if either 
" Ph E {B, I} for all h = 1, 2 . . . . .  k and B ~ {Ph: h = 1, 2 . . . . .  k}; or 
• Ph ~ {W,I} for all h = 1,2 . . . . .  k and W~ {Ph:h = 1,2 . . . . .  k}. 
We say that a cycle is rational if it is not irrational. Then, given any fuzzy 
preference p~ over a fixed set of alternatives and a chain of alternatives, we 
can look for all possible rational cycles of preferences, weigh them in a 
natural way and assign to the chain a degree of rationality. 
For example, given a chain (x - x) with only one alternative, we obtain 
two distinct cycles, xBx and xlx, of which only xlx is a rational cycle. The 
degree of rationality of such a chain (x - x) will be just ~t(x, x). If we 
consider the chain (x -y -  x) with two alternatives, only the cycles 
xByWx, xWyBx and xlylx, are rational. So, we can propose 
I~B(x, y)tZw(y,x ) + tZw(X, y)tzB(y,x ) + txt(x, y)Izt(x, y ) 
= IXB(X,y) 2 + IZw(X,y) 2 + tZI(x,y) 2 (2.4) 
as the natural degree of rationality for such a two-element chain. This 
procedure can be extended to chains containing three or more alterna- 
tives, by adding along all possible rational cycles the product of the 
intensities associated to each preference in such a cycle. For example, the 
chain (x - y - z - x) with three alternatives gives the following 13 ratio- 
nal cycles. 
xByBzWx xBylzWx xByWzBx xByWzlx xByWzWx 
xlyBzWx xlylzlx xlyWzBx 
xWyBzBx xWyBzlx xWyBzWx xWylzBx xWyWzBx 
and 14 irrational cycles. So, the degree of rationality associated to such a 
chain will be 
tzB(x, y)lxB(y, Z)gw(Z, X) + I~B(X, y)l~l(y, Z)I~w(Z, X) 
+ IxB(x,y)tzw(y,z) tzs(z ,x)  + txB(x,y)tZw(y,z)p.1(z,x) 
+ tzB(x,y)tzw(y,z)tzw(Z,X) + tzI(X,y)I~B(y,Z)~w(Z,X) 
+ Ixt(X, y)tzz(y, Z)~I(Z, X) + txt(X, y)txw(y, Z)tXB(Z, X) 
+ tZw(X,y)IxB(y,z)tXB(Z,X) + tZw(X,y)tzB(y,z)tzz(Z,X) 
+ ~w(X,y)tzB(y,z)txw(Z,X) + IXw(X,y)~I(y,z)~8(Z,X) 
+ txw(x,y)tzw(y,z) l .~,(Z,X).  
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In general, given a fuzzy preference relation /x and given a cycle 
C -X lP  1 ... xkPkx ~ where Ph ~ {B,I ,W} for all h = 1 ,2 , . . . , k ,  the nat- 
ural weight associated to C and denoted by A(C) will be 
k 
A(C)  = l l  I~ph(Xh,Xh+l) 
h=l  
where xk+ 1 = Xl for convenience. 
Therefore, given a chain G = (x 1 - x 2 . . . . .  x~ - x 1) a natural degree 
of rationality associated to G and denoted by A~(G) can be defined as 
Au(G) = E A(C) .  
C ~ rat.cycles 
We will now prove that A~(G) verifies 
A~(G) = 1 - tX(Xh,Xh+I) + I--[ IX(Xh+I,Xh) 
h=l  h=l  
-2  I-[ tZz(xh,Xh+l) • 
h=l 
Because of 2.3 we 
~w(X h,xh+l)) = 1, thus 
E 
rat .cycles 
On the other hand, 
(2.5) 
have FI~=I(I~B(Xh, Xh+l) + ~l(Xh, Xh+1) + 
a(c)= l -  E a(c). 
irrat.cycles 
k 
A(C) + Y'~ A(C') - -  2[-ItzI(Xh,Xh+1) , 
C~ B C '~ w h=l  
where ~n is the collection of all cycles of type XlPIX2P 2 "'" xkPkxl  with 
Ph ~ {B, I} for all h = 1, 2 , . . . ,  k, and ~w is the collection of all cycles of 
type x1P' lx2P '2  .." xkP 'kx  1 with P~ ~ {W, I}, for all h. So, ~B u ~w is the 
k k k 
H Id~(Xh'Xh+l) -}" U Idb(Xh+l,Xh) -- 2 FI I'~l(Xh,Xh+l) 
h=l  h=l  h=l  
k k 
= H (Id'B(Xh,Xh+l) + ]'t'I(Xh,Xh+l)) "+- H (I'%w(Xh,Xh+I) 
h=l  h=l  
k 
+ I~,(Xh, Xh +1 )) -- 2 I-I IXl(Xh, Xh +1) 
h=l  
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cOllection of all the irrational cycles plus the cycle of all indifferences, 
which in particular belongs to both ~B and ~w- Thus, 
k 
E a(c )  + E a (c ' )  - 2 FI  -- E A(C) 
C ~ ~B C' ~ ~' B h = 1 C e irrat.cycles 
which implies that 2.5 holds. 
Fixed a finite set of alternatives X, in view of 2.5, rationality can be 
defined as a fuzzy property A: J ° (X)  ~ [0, 1] with 
A(/x) = minAs(G) (2.6) 
G 
and where .~(X)  is the set of all complete fuzzy preferences. The degree 
of rationality is then associated to the minimum degree of acyclicity along 
all chains (see [1, 2]). 
Notice that complete fuzzy preference relations can be absolutely ratio- 
nal (i.e., A(/-0 = 1) or absolutely irrational (i.e., A(t~) = 0) without being 
a crisp preference relation, as we will show in the next two examples. 
Obviously, a crisp complete order will be absolutely rational if it is a linear 
order and absolutely irrational otherwise. 
EXAMPLE 2.1 Let us consider the following fuzzy preference relation 
defined on the set of alternatives {x, y, z} as: 
1 
I x (x ,y )  = ~(y ,x )  -- t z (y ,z )  = ~(z ,y )  = 1, t z (x ,z )  = ix (z ,x )  = -~. 
Such a fuzzy preference is absolutely irrational, that is A(/x) = 0. Indeed, 
1 
t~(x, y ) lx (y ,  z ) t z (z ,  x)  = 
1 
t z (y ,x ) t~(z ,y ) l .~(x ,  z)  = -~ 
tzt( x,  y ) lx t (y ,z ) l . L l (  z ,x  ) = O. 
Therefore, from 2.5 we have A(~)  = 0. [] 
EXAMPLE 2.2 Let us consider now the fuzzy pre~rence ~ defined on the 
set of alternatives {x, y, z} as: 
~(x ,y )  = ~(z ,y )  = 1, ~(y ,x )  =~(y ,z )  =0,  
1 
= = 
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Then, 
tz( x, y)tx(y,  z)tx( z, x) -- 0 
tx (y ,x ) tx (z ,y ) l~(X ,Z)  = 0 
I~i( x , y)t~i(y, z)l~i( z, x) = 0 
and, from 2.5 we have A(~)  = 1. [] 
In the following sections we will deal with the amalgamation f complete 
fuzzy preferences /x which are non absolutely irrational. As it has been 
proven in [8], if the set of alternatives X is fixed then there exist 
aggregation rules that assure non-irrational social preferences for all 
possible profiles of n non absolutely irrational individual opinions. That is 
the case, for example, of the mean rule, defined for x, y ~ X as 
27= ~ ~i(x, y) 
tr(p)  . . . . .  ~") (x ,y )  = (2.7) 
n 
As pointed out previously, we will not suppose that the set of alternatives 
is fixed and a necessary and sufficient condition for such non-irrational 
rules is given, generalizing in this way a partial result given in [9]. 
3. INTENSITY AMALGAMATION RULES AND 
ETHICAL CONDITIONS 
Once a group of n >_ 2 individuals is fixed, we should be able to 
aggregate their opinions about any set of alternatives in a coherent way. 
Therefore, we have to define aggregation operations that can take into 
account any extra alternative x so to properly extend any previous aggre- 
gated opinion relative to a collection of alternatives not containing x. Our 
proposal is based upon amalgamation mappings that will allow us the 
successive amalgamation of alternatives preferences one by one, and the 
key properties are the standard conditions 
Independence of lrrelevant Alternatives (IIA): each aggregated preference 
relation /x(x, y) depends solely on the values /xi(x, y), i.e. on the 
individual preference intensities of x over y. 
Unrestricted Domain (UD): the aggregation rule is defined over all 
possible profiles of fuzzy preferences. 
Under these conditions, we propose the following definition 
DEFINfFION 3.1 An intensity aggregation rule is any mapping ~b: [0, 1]" 
[0, 1] which assigns a fuzzy preference intensity to each profile of individuals 
fuzzy preference intensities. [] 
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Therefore, given 4' and any profile (/xl(x, y) . . . . .  /~n(x, y)) ~ [0, 1] n we 
can define the aggregated value 
p~(x,y) = 4 ' ( / z l (x ,y )  . . . . .  txn(x ,y ) ) .  
It is clear that if we also assume a standard neutrality condition in order 
to assure that the same intensity aggregation mapping 4' will be associated 
to any pair of alternatives, each possible aggregation procedure is charac- 
terized by one of these intensity aggregation mappings. Such a neutrality 
condition is: 
Neutrality (N): given any permutation of the set of alternatives 7r, if 
#(x ,  y) = ld(Tr(x), 7r(y)) for all i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n and any pair of alter- 
native x, y, then 
4'( ~,l(x, y ) , . . . ,  vn(x,  y ) )  = 4 ' ( /~' (Tr(x) ,  7 r (y ) ) , . . . , /~" (Tr (x ) ,  7r (y) ) )  
For the time being, we will suppose that conditions IIA, UD, N hold. 
Some ethical conditions may also be imposed to the intensity aggrega- 
tion rules: 
Non-negative Responsiveness (NNR): 
4'(a 1 , a 2 . . . . .  a n) > 4'(b I, b 2 . . . . .  b n) 
if a i > b i for all i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,n .  
Positive Responsiveness (PR): 
4'(al ,  a 2 . . . . .  a n) > 4'(b l ,b  2 . . . . .  b n) 
if a i> b i for all i = 1,2 . . . . .  n and there exists 1 < j  < n such that 
a j > b j. 
Anonimity (A): given any permutation of the set of individuals 
7r:{1,... ,  n} ~ {1, . . . ,  n}, we have 
4'(a 1, a 2 . . . . .  a n) = 6(a=(1) . . . . .  alr(n)). 
Unanimity (U): if a i = a for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, then 
6(a l ,a  2 . . . . .  a n) = a. 
Otizen Sovereign (CS): for any given a ~ [0, 1] there exists a profile 
(a 1, a 2 . . . . .  a n) ~ [0, 1] n such that 
4,(a 1,a 2 . . . . .  a n) =a .  
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Non-Dictatorship (ND): there is no individual i such that 
~b(a 1 , a 2 . . . . .  a n) = a i 
for any (a l . . . . .  a i - l , a  i+ l  . . . . .  a n) E [0 ,1 ]  n - l .  
It is easy to see that PR implies NNR, A implies ND and U implies CS. 
NNR (or PR) and CS together imply that ~b(1,..., 1) and ~b(0 . . . . .  0) = 0. 
At any rate, conditions NNR, CS and A can be considered a must in a 
general context and they are not in fact inconsistent. Many aggregation 
rules verifying all of the above conditions (or a meaningful subset of them) 
can be defined. For instance, the mean rule defined in 2.7. satisfies all the 
of the above conditions. 
4. NON-IRRATIONAL INTENSITY AGGREGATION RULES 
Following [9], absolute rationality cannot be claimed in many practical 
situations even for individuals. So, we should look for some non-absolute 
irrationality results. Notice that any possibility result in this context will 
justify the search for aggregation rules that are in some sense as good as 
possible. Therefore, we ask whether or not there exist aggregation rules 
assuring non-absolutely irrational aggregated preferences, according to the 
following definition. 
DEFINITION 4.1 Given n individuals, an intensity aggregation rule 
&: [0, 1] n ~ [0, 1] is non absolutely irrational (NA1), or simply non-irra- 
tional, if for any arbitrary finite set of alternatives X, the associated 
aggregated preference tz: X × X ~ [0, 1] is complete and non-absolutely 
irrational, i.e., A(I~) > O, whenever all individuals are complete and non- 
absolutely irrational themselves, i.e., A(~i )  > 0 for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, with 
/zi: X × X ~ [0, 1] for all i. [] 
Notice that we are using the terms rational or non-irrational when refer- 
ring to procedures that lead respectively to rational or irrational cycles. 
Notice as well that both individual and social opinions are required to 
belong to the set of Non-Absolutely Irrational (NAI) complete fuzzy 
preference relations. Therefore, we are in fact modifying the Unrestricted 
Domain condition. 
For example, the minimum rule 
m(a 1 . . . . .  a n) = min a i (4.8) 
i=1  . . . . .  n 
cannot be considered because it does not guarantee completeness, and the 
maximum rule 
M(a l . . . . .  a n) ~ max a i (4.9) 
i=1  . . . . .  n 
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may lead to irrational social preference relations (see Theorem 4.2 below), 
even though it assures completeness. 
As a direct consequence of the above definitions we have 
LEMMA 4.1 Given an intensity aggregation rule 4): [0, 1] n ~ [0, 1] the 
associated aggregated fuzzy preference relation I~ is complete, for  any profile 
o f  complete individual preferences, if and only i f  
4)(a 1 . . . .  , a n) -~- 4)(hi,..., b n) >_ 1 
whenever a i + b i > 1 for  all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n. • 
In view of Lemma 4.1., we say that an aggregation rule 4) is complete if 
and only if 4)(aX,..., a n) + 4) (b l , . . . ,  b n) > 1 whenever a i + b i > 1 for all 
i -- 1,2 . . . . .  n. 
A useful characterization of complete intensity aggregations i given by 
the following theorem. 
THEOREM 4.1 An intensity aggregation rule 4): [0, 1] n ~ [0, 1] verifying 
NNR is complete if and only if 
4)(a 1 . . . . .  a n) + 4) (1 -a  I . . . . .  1 -a  n) > 1 
for all (a 1 . . . . .  a n) ~ [0, 1] n. 
Proof  If  a i + b i > 1 for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, then in view of NNR it must 
be 
4)(a 1 . . . . .  a n) + 4) (ba , . . . ,b  n) > 4)(a 1 . . . .  , a  n) + 4)(1 -a  1 . . . . .  1 -a  n) 
>1.  
The converse is trivial. 
The following results allow us to characterize our non-irrational aggre- 
gation rules. 
THEOREM 4.2 Let  4): [0, 1] n ~ [0, 1] be a complete intensity aggregation 
rule verifying condition A and such that 4)(1 . . . . .  1) = 1 and 4)(0 . . . . .  O) = 
O. Then 4) is NA I  if and only if the fol lowing conditions hold: 
(i) i f  a i + b i > 1 for  all i = 1,2 . . . . .  n; then 4)(a 1 . . . . .  a n) + 
O(b 1 . . . . .  b n) > 1; 
(ii) 4)(a 1 . . . . .  a n) = 1 implies a i = 1 for  all i = 1, 2 . . . .  , n. 
Proof  Suppose first that 4> is complete and verifies conditions (i)-(ii). 
Given an arbitrary chain of alternatives G - (x 1 - x:  . . . . .  x m - x 1) and 
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denoted by/z the aggregated preference corresponding to 4', in view of the 
rationality of the individuals two cases are possible: 
(a) there exists an individual rational cycle with some strict preference, 
i.e., there exists i and a rational cycle x~Plx2P 2 ... XmPmX l such 
that 
- -there exists h such that Ph = B and then because the cycle is 
rational there exists k ~ h such that Pk = W; 
--FIm 1)> O. h' = 1 ,. Xh' + 
Notice that tz~(Xh, Xh+ I) > 0 implies tZi(Xh+l,Xh) < 1. Hence, in 
view of (ii) we have tX(Xh+i,X h) < 1 and then tzB(Xh, Xh+ 1) > O. 
Analogously, from /Z~w(Xk, xk+l) > 0 we can deduce that t~w(X k, 
xk+ 1) > 0. Let us then consider the cycle 
xlPlx2P2 "'" Xh-lPh - lxhBxh+I "'" xkWxk+l "'" XmPmXl 
This cycle will be rational no matter how we define Ph' in {W, I, B} 
for any h' different from h and k. Moreover, since for any pair 
(Xh', xj,+ l) 
~B(Xh',Xh'+I) + m(Xh' ,Xh'+l)  + ~w(Xh',Xh'+J) = 1, 
it must be the case that at least one of the three values above is 
greater then zero. So, by choosing one of such positive values for 
each h', we can certainly build a rational cycle for G whose weight 
is greater than zero. Therefore, A~,(G) > O. 
(b) For any individual i = 1, 2 . . . .  , n, the rational cycle of all individual 
indifferences, xl Ix21 ... IXmlX 1, has positive weight. Thus, we have 
]..£~(Xh, Xh+ 1) > 0 for all i = 1 ,2 , . . . ,n  and for all h = 1,2 . . . . .  m, 
which implies that tz i (Xh , Xh+ 1 ) -{'- ].zi(Xh+ 1' Xh)  > 1. Therefore, in 
view of condition (i) we have tz(x h, Xh+ ~) + tZ(Xh+ 1, Xh) > 1 which 
in turn implies that tx1(Xh, Xh+ 1) > 0 for all h = 1, 2 , . . . ,  m. Once 
again, A~,(G) > O. 
Because G was an arbitrary chain, from case (a) and (b) above we can 
conclude that /x and in turn 4' are not irrational whenever conditions 
(i)-(ii) are satisfied. 
Conversely, suppose that 4' verifies the hypotheses of the theorem. 
Reasoning by contradiction, two cases are possible: 
CASE 1: (i) is not verified. Therefore, 
4 , (a l , . . . , a  n) + (b(b I . . . . .  b n) = 1 
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for some (a 1 . . . .  , an), (b 1 . . . . .  b n) ~ [0, 1] n such that a i + b i > 1 for all 
i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n. If  we then define for all i 
~i(x ,y )  = i~ i (y ,x )  = 1, i j . i (y , z )  = I~ i (z ,y )  = 1, 
~J~i(z, X) = a i, ].~i(x, Z) = b i 
for three different alternatives x, y, z, and put G = (x - y - z - x)  we 
have that for all i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n, 
I~i(x, y)~i (y ,  z)l~i( z,  x )  = a i 
I~i(y, X)IZi(z, y) Iz i(x,  Z) = b i 
tz~(x, y ) tz~(y ,  z) lx~( z,  x )  = tz~( x,  z )  = a i + b i - 1. 
So, because 1 - (a  i + b i - 2(a i + b i -  1) )= l - (2 - (a  i + bi)) = a i+  
b ~ - 1 > 0 for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, we have that each /d is non irrational. 
However,  since ~b(1 . . . . .  1) = 1, for the aggregated preference /z we have 
/~(x ,y )  = ~(y ,x )  = I~(y ,z )  = I~(z ,y )  = 1, ~1(x ,z )  = 0 
and so 
/x(x, y ) /~(y ,  z)p~(z ,  x )  +/ .~(y,  x ) t~(z ,  y )p , (x ,  z )  
- 2 tx t (x ,y )p~(y ,z ) l~ l (Z ,X  ) = I~(z ,x )  + I~(x ,z )  = 1 
which implies that A( /~) = 0. So, /~ is irrational,  which contradicts the 
initial hypothesis. 
CASE 2: (ii) is not verified. Therefore,  there exists (a 1 . . . . .  a n) ~ [0, 1] n 
such that 4~(a l , . . . ,  an) = 1 with a j < 1 for some j. Let  then G = (x 1 - x 2 
. . . . .  xn+ 1 -x  1) be a chain with n + 1 alternatives. Moreover,  for each 
individual i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n, define 
l~ i (xn+l ,x l )  = 1, I~ i (x l ,xn+l )  = O, and 
I~i(Xk,Xk+l) "~- a R(i+k-1), I, Z i (Xk+l ,Xk)  = 1, 
for each k = 1 . . . . .  n, where R( j )  = j rood n. 
Not ice that p~(xn+ 1, x 1) = 0, therefore for each individual i we have: 
n+l  n 
H ]3J(Xk, Xk+l )  = U an¢i+k-1) 
k=l  k=l  
n+l  
1-I   (xk+l,xk) = 0 
k=l  
n+l  
FI   4(xk,xk+l) = 0 
k=l  
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where x,+ 2 =x 1. Because a J< 1 for some j, [ I~_la t~(i+k-I) 4:1 which 
implies that p i is non-irrational. 
For the aggregated opinion # we have that for all k = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, 
i~(x k , x , .  i) = 4)( aj, ai+ ' . . . . .  a", a I . . . . .  a J - l ) .  
Therefore, because of the anonimity condition for all k = 1 . . . . .  n 
IZ(Xk,Xk+I) = 49(a L . . . . .  a n) = 1. 
Moreover, from the hypotheses we have 
~(x~,x , ,+~)  = O. ~(x , ,~ ,x~)  = I 
which implies that ~l(x,,+ 1, x 1) = 0. So, 
n+ I 
1-I . (x~,x ,+ l )  = 1 
k=l  
n+l  
H ~'£(Xk+l' Xl() = 0 
k=l  
n+l  
[ - I  ~(xk ,  x~ + 1 ) = 0 
k=l  
which in turn imply that /z is irrational, contradicting the initial hypothe- 
sis. 
The theorem is then proven. 
REMARK 4.1 From the first part of the proof of Theorem 4.2. we can 
conclude that in order for a complete intensity aggregation rule to be NAI, 
conditions (i) and (ii) are sufficient. • 
We now have two immediate corollaries of theorem 4.2. 
COROLIARY 4.1 A complete intensity aggregation rule &: [0, 1]" --* [0, 1] 
verifying conditions NNR, CS and A is NA1 if and only if conditions ( i ) - ( i i )  
of Theorem 4.2. hold. • 
Proof Trivial, because NNR and CS imply that 49(1 . . . . .  1) = 1 and 
49(0 . . . . .  0) = 0. 
COROLLARY 4.2 Let 49: [0, 1]" --* [0, 1] be a complete intensity aggrega- 
tion rule verifying condition PR. Then 49 is NAI. 
Proof  In view of Remark 4.1., we only need to prove that (i) and (ii) 
are verified. 
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To prove that (i) is verified, observe that from the completeness hypoth- 
esis and from Theorem 4.1. we have 
~b(a 1 . . . .  , a ' )  + ~b(b 1 . . . . .  b n) > 4~(a l , . . . ,a  n) + 4~(1 - a I . . . . .  1 - a ' )  > 1 
whenever a i + b i > 1 for all i = 1, 2 , . . . ,  n. 
(ii) follows immediately from PR. • 
EXAMPLE 4.1 By applying Corollary 4.2. we can easily prove that the 
following intensity aggregation rule (see [10], pg. 60) is NAh 
• Weighted  Genera l i zed  Mean:  given w 1 . . . . .  wn, positive real numbers 
and r > 1, then 
WGM ( a l ,  . . . , a n) = 
i=1 r.~=lw~ 
where the assumption r > 1 has been made in order to assure 
completeness. [] 
EXAMPLE 4.2 By applying Theorem 4.2. we can prove that some elements 
of the class of mixed rules defined in [4] are NAI .  Given a ~ [0, 1] the 
corresponding rule is defined as 
infi a i 
°~(a l ,  ' ' . ,  an) = sup/a  i 
o/ 
I f  a = 1 we obtain the maximum rule (cf. 4.9.) and therefore we have a 
complete but irrational rule. I f  a = 0 we obtain the min imum rule (cf. 4.8.) 
and therefore we have an incomplete rule. I f  0 < a < 1, consider the 
following example with two 
/zi( x, y)  
I x i (y ,  z )  
12(z, x) 
tL~( x ,z )  
if a i >_ ot for all i -- 1 ,2 , . . . ,  n 
if a i <_ ot for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n • 
otherwise 
In this case, the two individuals are non-irrational because a > 0. How- 
ever, the aggregation rule ~ verifies 
~(x ,y )  = ~(y ,x )  = 1 
~(y ,z )  = ~(z ,y )  = 1 
~(x ,z )  = ~(z ,x )  = ~. 
individuals and three alternatives x, y, z 
=l~i (y ,x )  = 1 V i= 1,2 
= tz i ( z ,  y )  = 1 V i  = 1 ,2  
~--- ]Z2(X,  Z)  -~- 1 
= t~2(z ,  x )  = a .  
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1 1 Therefore,  /x is irrational for a = ~ and non complete for a < ~. 
1 Let us then fix 7 < a < 1. It is clear that condition (ii) is verified. Let us 
then prove that condition (i) also holds. 
We want to prove that a(a  a . . . . .  a n) + ot(b I . . . . .  b n) > l if for all 
i = 1,2 . . . . .  n, a ~ + b ~ > 1. Several cases are possible and they can all be 
trivially reduced to one of the following: 
1. a (a  l . . . . .  a n) >_ a and a(b  I . . . . .  b n) >_ a :  the result is true because 
1 
2. a (a  1 . . . . .  a n )=sup i  ai and a(b  l . . . . .  b n )=a:  in this case there 
exists j such that b ) < a. Therefore,  supi a i + ce >~ supi a i + b j >_ a J 
+bJ> 1. 
3. 
. 
a(a  l . . . . .  a n) = sup/a  i and a(b  1 . . . . .  b n) = sup/bi:  we have supi a i 
+sup/b  ~>a I +b 1 > 1. 
a(a  1 . . . . .  a n )= in f ia  i and a(b  I . . . . .  b n )=sup/b i :  then, if a j=  
infi a i we have 
a j + supb ~ > a j + b j > l .  
i 
Completeness can be prove in an analogous manner.  Therefore,  in view of 
1 Remark  4.1. we can conclude that the rule is NAI  for any ~ < a < 1. [] 
EXAMPLE 4.3 Another  example of intensity aggregation rule that can 
easily be proven to be NAI  by applying Theorem 4.1. to prove complete- 
ness and Theorem 4.2. to prove non-absolute irrationality, is the following: 
min{a'  . . . . .  a n} + max{a'  . . . . .  a n} 
y (a '  . . . . .  a n) : [] 
2 
Notice that all of the intensity aggregation rules given in the examples 
above, verify NNR,  A, U, CS, and ND. 
5. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUMBER OF ALTERNATIVES 
It is clear that one of the key points of our approach is that we suppose 
no knowledge about the number  of alternatives. We assumed that NAI  
intensity aggregation rules should never lead to absolute irrationality, 
independently from the number  of alternatives. 
In our context, of course, there is no decision problem when their is only 
one feasible alternative x, and we expect absolute rationality. Indeed, the 
values /zg(x, x) = 1 for all i could have been easily assumed by hypothesis, 
and then the aggregated value, under general ethical conditions, would 
have been /~(x, x) = 1. 
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If there are just two feasible alternatives we could say that in fact there 
are no irrational rules. Notice that the preference values tz(x,y) and 
/z(y, x) will never lead by themselves to absolute irrationality, because in 
view of equation 2.4, A~({x - y - x}) = 0 if and only if 
txn(x ,y )  2 + tX l (x ,y )  2 + tZw(X,y)  2 = 0 
which is impossible because I~a(x, y) +/z / (x ,  y) + tXw(X, y) = 1. 
Therefore, any intensity aggregation rule will produce aggregated pref- 
erences /z such that A~(G) > 0 for all chains G with two elements. This is 
consistent with Arrow's crisp model that does not lead to an Impossibility 
Theorem when the number of alternatives i either one or two. In general, 
ethical rules with absolute rationality are not possible in the crisp context 
when three or more alternatives are present, but they are possible if the 
absolute rationality condition is dropped out. 
Finally, it must be noticed that in proving the necessity part of Theorem 
4.2. we needed long chains. Indeed, when condition (ii) does not hold, 
irrationality is proven for long chains with more alternatives than individu- 
als. Such a characterization does not hold if the number of alternatives has 
been a priori fixed and it is smaller than n, as it will be shown in the 
following example. This fact may suggest a search for additional assump- 
tions leading to rules where short chains do not produce absolute irra- 
tionality for the aggregated values. 
However, in this paper we did not want to impose any kind of restriction 
on the number of alternatives, o that an aggregation rule is considered to 
be non irrational if and only if no chain of any length can produce 
irrationality. 
EXAMPLE 5.1 Let us consider a group with n > 5 people and the follow- 
ing intensity aggregation rule: 
En 
, =la' i f l{ i :a i= l} l<n_ l  ~( al . . . . .  a~) = n 
1 otherwise 
It can be easily seen that ~0 is complete and it verifies NNR, A, and CS. 
Moreover, because it does not verify condition (ii) of Theorem 4.2., we can 
conclude that it is irrational. In this case, chains with six alternatives may 
lead to irrationality. However, any chain with three alternatives cannot 
lead to irrationality. Indeed, given a chain G = (x - y - z - x) two cases 
are possible 
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(a) there exist individuals i, j, l such that 
txi(x,y) + txi(y,x) > 1 
~;(x,z) + y (z ,x )  > 1 
txt(y,z) + I~t(z,y) > 1. 
Then the cycle of indifferences xIyIzlx will have positive weight for 
the aggregated relation IX. This is due to the fact that if at least one 
individual has positive indifference over a pair of alternatives, then 
the aggregated preference will have positive indifference over the 
same pair. For example, because ixi(x, y) + /xi(y, x) > 1 then 
~(x ,y )  + ~(y ,x )  
E}_, (~/(x ,y)  + . J ' (y.x)) 
>1 
because all relations are complete. 
(b) there exist a pair in the chain (without loss of generality we can 
suppose that such a pair is (x, y)) such that for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n 
.~(x ,y )  + .~(y ,x )  = 1 
i Therefore, for all i = 1, 2 . . . . .  n, p~}(x, y) = 0 and /x~(x, y) +/Xw(X, y) = 
1. 
To the pair (x, y )we associate two sets W~x,y ~and B~x.y ) that represent 
respectively the set of individuals j such that tX~v(X, y) > 0 and the set of 
individuals i such that #~(x, y) > 0. Analogously for the other pairs (y, z) 
and (z, x). 
Notice that if any of the W [resp. B] sets has cardinality at least two then 
the aggregated opinion ix w [resp. IXe] computed on the corresponding 
pair, will have positive weight. 
Three cases are possible: 
1. IB(x,y)l > 4 and IW~x, yll < 1. 
The above hypothesis implies that for at least four individuals 
i, tx~(x, y) = 1 and ixiw(X, y) = O. 
Let us prove that either a cycle of type xByWzPx or of type xByPzWx 
must have positive weight, where P ~ {I, W, B}. Notice that if either 
ixw(y, z) or iXw(Z, x) have positive weight we are done. 
Suppose by contradiction that ixw(y, z) = txw(z, x) = 0. Therefore, 
for at least four individuals j, it must be /xi(y, z) = 1 and /x~v(y, z) 
= 0; and for at least four individuals l it must be /x/(z, x) = 1 and 
~(z ,  x) = 0. 
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From the hypotheses we have 
IB(~,y)l >_ 4, IW(x,y)l-< 1, IW(y,~)l _< 1, IW(~,~)l _< 1. 
Because all individuals are not irrational and for each individual the 
indifference cycle has weight zero, there must be at least five cycles 
with strict preferences whose weight is positive. Each of these five 
cycles must contain both a W and a B in order to be rational. So, for 
each individual we must put at least one element in a B-set and at 
least one element in a W-set and these two sets must correspond to 
different pairs. On the other hand, the total number of elements that 
we can put in W-sets is at most three. We then reach a contradiction. 
2. IB(x,y)l _< 1 and IW(x,y)l >_ 4. This case is analogous to the previous 
one. 
3. [B(x,y )] > 2 and ]W(x,y)[ _> 2. 
Once again let us consider the cycles either of type xByWzPx or of 
type xByPzWx and suppose that ixw( y, z) = tZw( Z, x) = O. 
We then have, 
[B(x,y)l >_ 2, IW~x,y)l >__ 2, IW~y,~l _< 1, IW.,x)l-< 1. 
Because we have to put five elements in the W-sets it must be 
IW~,y)l > 3. Three of the elements in W~,y) must also belong either 
to B(y,z ~ or to B(~,x) for otherwise they would not be rational. 
Therefore, either B(y,z) or B(z,,) has two elements, which lets us 
conclude that/~ is a non-irrational. [] 
Generalizing Example 5.1. it can be analogously proven that k-element 
chains do not lead to irrationality of the rule ~p when the number of 
individuals is n > 2k - 1. 
The example above suggests that, in general, aggregation rules for which 
there are k-element chains with zero degree of rationality, will lead to 
longer chains with zero degree of rationality. This is consistent with our 
intuition that decision problems become more complex as the number of 
alternatives under consideration gets larger. The next result is based upon 
well-known results in social choice theory. 
THEOREM 5.1 Given k >__ 3, if an intensity aggregation rule 4': [0, 1] n --, 
[0, 1] satisfying 4'(1 . . . . .  1) = 1 leads to zero degree of rationality for 
k-element chains, it does so for (k + 1)-element chains. 
Proof Denote as usual with ~ the aggregation rule associated to 4'. 
Let us consider a chain with k alternatives G = (x 1 - x 2 . . . . .  x k - xl) , 
such that A~,(G) = 0 for some /x 1 . . . .  ,/x n non-absolutely irrational prefer- 
ence relations. Consider now the chain 
G '= (X 1 - -X  2 . . . . .  X k - -Xk+ 1 - -X1)  
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and put for all i = 1 . . . . .  n 
]"£i(Xk, Xk+ 1 ) = I"£i(Xk' XI)' ]d'i(Xk+ 1' Xk) = ]"£i(Xl' Xk) '  
t z i (x l ,x~+l )  = ~ i (Xk+l ,X l )  = 1. 
For any rational cycle 
C -- x lP lx :zP  2 "'" xkPkxk+ iPl,+ lXt 
two possibilities arise: 
1. Pk+i ~ {W,B} then since tx l (xk+l ,x  1) = 1 it is clear that 
I, zA(x,,,+ 1, x l )  = tzw(x,,,+l, xl) = 0. Therefore, the weight associated 
to C is zero. 
2. Pk+l = I then 
C' = x1P~x2P 2 "" X~PkX 1 
is a rational cycle. Moreover, because ix~(xk+l,x j) = 1 for all i = 
1,2 . . . .  , n,/.~l(xk+ ~, x 1) = 1. Therefore, the weight of C is equal to 
the weight of C' which is zero since Au(G)  = O. 
Summing up, A~(G' )  = 0 and the theorem is proven. II 
6. FINAL COMMENTS 
It must be pointed out once again that the aggregation model here 
developed is restricted to aggregation rules that can be represented by a 
unique intensity aggregation rule, once conditions IIA, UD, and N have 
been assumed. As a direct consequence we have that these aggregation 
rules are defined without taking into account he number of alternatives. 
Therefore, Non-Absolutely Irrational (NAI) rules are those rules associ- 
ated to intensity aggregation rules that will never lead to absolute irra- 
tionality. A characterization f these NAI rules has been given. By means 
of this characterization, the non-irrationality of many rules can be checked 
quite easily. Notice in particular the importance of Corollary 4.2. Any 
complete rule satisfying positive responsiveness, that is any complete rule 
which is sensitive to individual changes, is automatically a non-absolutely 
irrational intensity aggregation rule. 
Moreover, it is obvious that if a given rule leads to k-element chains 
with zero degree of rationality, such a rule can never be considered in 
aggregation problems with more than k alternatives. In addition, notice 
that from Example 5.1 and Theorem 5.1 we can infer that ethical rules 
leading to k-element chains with zero degree of rationality will also lead to 
longer chains with zero degree of rationality. This shows that the number 
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of alternatives makes in fact more complex (though still solvable) the 
aggregation problem. This fact is very well-known from practice, and it 
cannot be deduced from Arrow's paradox. Indeed, in such a crisp context 
we can simply conclude that only with two alternatives we can find 
(absolute) rationality. In our model, we have seen how the number of 
possible rules decreases with the number of alternatives from the case in 
which there are only two alternatives where no rule leads to absolute 
irrationality, to the general case with an unknown number of alternatives, 
where we have proven the existence of rules that never lead to irrational- 
ity. 
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